Analytic approximations for (s,S) inventory policy operating characteristics

The operating characteristics of (s,S) inventory systems are often difficult to compute, making systems analysis a tedious and often expensive undertaking. Approximate expressions for operating characteristics are presented with a view towards simplified analysis of systems behavior. The operating characteristics under consideration are the expected values of: total cost per period, period-end inventory, period-end stockout quantity, replenishment cost per period, and backlog frequency. The approximations are obtained by a two step procedure. First, exact expressions for the operating characteristics are approximated by simplified functions. Then the approximations are used to design regression models which are fitted to the operating characteristics of a large number of inventory items with diverse parameter settings. Accuracy to within a few percent of actual values is typical for most of the approximations.     

Longitudinal manpower planning models

A manpower planning model is presented that exploits the longitudinal stability of manpower cohorts. The manpower planning process is described. An infinite horizon linear program for calculating minimum cost manpower input plans is presented and found to have a straightforward solution in a great many cases and to yield an easily implemented approximation technique in other cases.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

How to rethink war: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine1

This article examines the role of ideas in US Army innovation after the Vietnam War. It challenges the view that failure, changes in the strategic environment or technology are the sole drivers of military innovation and analyses the role of ideas and identity in the army's development of AirLand battle doctrine. It highlights how the reform in ideas led to a ‘re-conception’ of the strategic environment, the nature and dynamics of warfare and a change in self-understanding. The organisational reforms embodied these ideas and led to a new way of war practised in the first Gulf War.     

The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail

Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemmas in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state-or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state-in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.